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 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">National Security and Strategic Planning</journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title xml:lang="en">National Security and Strategic Planning</journal-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Национальная безопасность и стратегическое планирование</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn publication-format="print">2307-1400</issn>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">6ad7a50df4b8442fc24c0622</article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.37468/2307-1400-2026-2-48-62</article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="ru">
     <subject>Экономическая безопасность</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="en">
     <subject>Economic security</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group>
     <subject>Экономическая безопасность</subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    <article-title xml:lang="en">Corporate raiding and regulation of the mergers and acquisitions market: effects of soft budget constraints and institutionalization</article-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Корпоративное рейдерство и регулирование рынка слияний и поглощений: эффекты мягких бюджетных ограничений и институционализации</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </title-group>
   <contrib-group content-type="authors">
    <contrib contrib-type="author">
     <name-alternatives>
      <name xml:lang="ru">
       <surname>Зайцев</surname>
       <given-names>Владислав Олегович</given-names>
      </name>
      <name xml:lang="en">
       <surname>Zaitsev</surname>
       <given-names>Vladislav O.</given-names>
      </name>
     </name-alternatives>
     <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/>
    </contrib>
    <contrib contrib-type="author">
     <name-alternatives>
      <name xml:lang="ru">
       <surname>Челак</surname>
       <given-names>Светлана Васильевна</given-names>
      </name>
      <name xml:lang="en">
       <surname>Chelak</surname>
       <given-names>Svetlana V.</given-names>
      </name>
     </name-alternatives>
     <email>sv1135@mail.ru</email>
     <bio xml:lang="ru">
      <p>кандидат экономических наук;</p>
     </bio>
     <bio xml:lang="en">
      <p>candidate of economic sciences;</p>
     </bio>
     <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group>
   <aff-alternatives id="aff-1">
    <aff>
     <institution xml:lang="ru">Санкт-Петербургский государственный экономический университет</institution>
     <city xml:lang="ru">Санкт-Петербург</city>
    </aff>
    <aff>
     <institution xml:lang="en">Saint Petersburg State University of Economics</institution>
     <city xml:lang="en">Saint Petersburg </city>
    </aff>
   </aff-alternatives>
   <pub-date publication-format="print" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2026-07-30T21:00:00+00:00">
    <day>30</day>
    <month>07</month>
    <year>2026</year>
   </pub-date>
   <pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2026-07-30T21:00:00+00:00">
    <day>30</day>
    <month>07</month>
    <year>2026</year>
   </pub-date>
   <volume>2026</volume>
   <issue>2</issue>
   <fpage>48</fpage>
   <lpage>62</lpage>
   <history>
    <date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2025-12-21T21:00:00+00:00">
     <day>21</day>
     <month>12</month>
     <year>2025</year>
    </date>
    <date date-type="accepted" iso-8601-date="2026-05-11T21:00:00+00:00">
     <day>11</day>
     <month>05</month>
     <year>2026</year>
    </date>
   </history>
   <permissions>
    <copyright-statement xml:lang="ru">© 2026 Зайцев В.О., Челак С.В.</copyright-statement>
    <copyright-statement xml:lang="en">© 2026 Zaitsev V.O., Chelak S.V.</copyright-statement>
    <copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
    <copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Зайцев Владислав Олегович, Челак Светлана Васильевна</copyright-holder>
    <copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Zaitsev Vladislav O., Chelak Svetlana V.</copyright-holder>
   </permissions>
   <self-uri xlink:href="https://futurepubl.ru/en/nauka/publications/6ad7a50df4b8442fc24c0622/view">https://futurepubl.ru/en/nauka/publications/6ad7a50df4b8442fc24c0622/view</self-uri>
   <abstract xml:lang="ru">
    <p>Исследование посвящено влиянию корпоративного рейдерства на рынок слияний и поглощений и на систему его регулирования. Цель работы заключалась в выявлении эффектов, через которые рейдерство воздействует на рынок и на регулятора, и обосновании мер по их корректировке. Рассмотрены системы регулирования рынка корпоративного контроля в США, ЕС и России. Показано, что ключевым инструментом регулирования является предварительная проверка сделок уполномоченным органом, которая нацелена на защиту конкуренции и сам уязвим для влияния крупных участников рынка. На основе анализа критериев рейдерского захвата предложено определение рейдерства, в котором ключевым признаком выступает участие агента принуждения, а незаконность действий не является обязательной. Сравнительный анализ периодов интенсификации рейдерства в США, России и постсоциалистических странах Центральной и Восточной Европы позволил выделить два эффекта: положительную обратную связь от использования мягких бюджетных ограничений и институционализацию рейдерства как механизма перераспределения собственности. Оба эффекта могут оставаться латентными и затрагивать сам регулирующий орган. Предложены меры по защите регулятора от захвата (ротация кадров, ретроспективная оценка решений по сделкам, рейтинг доверия экспертов), поэтапный вывод рыночной функции рейдерства в правовое поле, структурированный диалог с крупными участниками рынка и защищенный канал анонимных сообщений о нарушениях.</p>
   </abstract>
   <trans-abstract xml:lang="en">
    <p>The article examines how corporate raiding affects the mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) market and its regulatory system. The aim is to identify the effects through which raiding influences both the market and the regulator and to propose measures to correct them. The study reviews the regulation of the market for corporate control in the USA, the EU and Russia and shows that its key instrument, ex ante review of transactions by an authorized body, is designed to protect competition and is itself vulnerable to the influence of large market participants. Based on an analysis of the criteria of a raider takeover, the article proposes a definition of raiding in which the key feature is the involvement of an enforcement agent, while illegality is not a necessary condition. A comparative analysis of periods of intensified raiding in the USA, Russia and the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe reveals two effects: a positive feedback effect from the use of soft budget constraints and the institutionalization of raiding as a mechanism of property redistribution. Both effects may remain latent and may affect the regulator itself. The article proposes measures to protect the regulator from capture (staff rotation, ex post evaluation of merger decisions, expert trust ratings), gradual legalization of the market function of raiding, a structured dialogue with major market participants and a protected channel for anonymous reporting of violations.</p>
   </trans-abstract>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="ru">
    <kwd>корпоративный контроль</kwd>
    <kwd>корпоративное рейдерство</kwd>
    <kwd>рынок слияний и поглощений</kwd>
    <kwd>регулирование</kwd>
    <kwd>мягкие бюджетные ограничения</kwd>
    <kwd>институционализация рейдерства</kwd>
    <kwd>недружественные поглощения</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="en">
    <kwd>corporate control</kwd>
    <kwd>corporate raiding</kwd>
    <kwd>mergers and acquisitions market</kwd>
    <kwd>regulation</kwd>
    <kwd>soft budget constraints</kwd>
    <kwd>institutionalization of raiding</kwd>
    <kwd>hostile takeovers</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
 <body>
  <p></p>
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